Intelligence reform in new democracies:  factors supporting or arresting progress by Matei, Florina Cristiana & Bruneau, Thomas
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2011-06
Intelligence reform in new democracies: 
factors supporting or arresting progress
Matei, Florina Cristiana
Democratization, Volume 18, Number 3, June 2011, pp. 602-630
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43281
Intelligence reform in new democracies:
factors supporting or arresting progress
Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau∗
Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, USA
(Received February 2010; final version received September 2010)
This article examines an important (and most problematic) component of the
democratic civil–military relations (CMR) concept (understood in terms of
democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency of the armed forces, police
forces, and intelligence agencies). It focuses (1) on the democratization of
intelligence, that is finding a proper balance between intelligence effectiveness
and transparency, and (2) on what particular factors support or arrest progress
in the democratization of intelligence. The article provides supporting examples
from Brazil and Romania, two developing democracies that have been
undergoing major reforms of their intelligence systems for almost 20 years, in
terms of both transparency and effectiveness.
Keywords: civil–military relations; democratization; intelligence and
democracy; intelligence reform; democratization of intelligence; civilian
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Introduction
This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary
significance for democracy and democratic consolidation of the relationship
between elected leaders and intelligence services in developing democracies. It
draws from an earlier article, published in Democratization in 2008, entitled
“Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil–Military
Relations”, which expanded the prevalent civil–military relations (CMR)
concept, (concerned primarily with the armed forces and narrowed to issues of
military intrusion in domestic politics through coups d’e´tat and asserting civilian
control) to a conceptualization and framework that better suit the twenty-first
century security landscape – a trinity of democratic civilian control, effectiveness
(fulfilling the assigned roles and missions – from war, to peacekeeping, to intelli-
gence, to counterterrorism), and efficiency (fulfilling the assigned roles and
missions at a minimum cost) of the security forces. We believe intelligence can
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be analysed in terms of the CMR trinity for several reasons: in most of the newer
democracies, intelligence was a monopoly of the military, and trying to reform it
leads to familiar issues in the CMR literature on transitions and the dismantling
of lingering military prerogatives;1 in some established democracies (including
the USA and France) the military still plays a predominant role in intelligence;2
in other countries, while most attention is given by civil societies actors to
reforms leading to new, civilian organizations, military intelligence often
remains central to the whole intelligence system, intact, and commonly over-
looked; and, both intelligence and the armed forces share the same ultimate
goal, to safeguard national security. It must be acknowledged up front that only
two-thirds of our CMR framework can fruitfully be applied to matters of intelli-
gence due to secrecy; while both democratic civilian control and effectiveness
can be determined (although with regard to effectiveness, the data are much
more available in older democracies than newer ones, and even there, limited
due to inherent secrecy surrounding intelligence work), the same cannot be said
of efficiency, which is almost impossible to quantify as budgets are most often
secret and intelligence is most successful when nothing is publicly heard about it.
Reforming intelligence in a newer democracy (i.e. institutionalizing intelli-
gence agencies that are under democratic control and effective) is an extremely
challenging process. That is, first of all, because all democracies, both new and
long established, confront a fundamental and unavoidable dilemma, or even
paradox: democracy, which is based on accountability of the governors to the
governed, requires transparency, including working within the rule of law and
respecting human rights, checks and balances, and defined mandates; conversely,
intelligence at least at some level, requires secrecy to be effective, which negates
to some degree both accountability and transparency. There is no solution to the
“security–democracy” paradox; rather, all democracies must grapple as best as
they can with balancing transparency and secrecy. Well-established democracies,
like USA or Great Britain, have developed institutions to deal with this
dilemma, but balancing security with transparency is always a work-in-progress.
To exemplify, Sir David Omand, former security and intelligence coordinator in
the UK’s Cabinet Office and former Permanent Secretary in the Home Office,
makes an apt analogy between the “intelligence–democracy” dilemma and
the “Cheshire Cat” in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”,3 and questions
whether it is possible to benefit from the Cheshire Cat’s grin (i.e. transparency
regarding intelligence work/activity), while the body, and more importantly
the claws, remains hidden (i.e. secrecy inherently involved in intelligence
work).
This article will examine crucial factors that either support or arrest progress in
the democratic reform of intelligence (or democratization of intelligence). It will
start with a brief review of the relevant themes in this topic, followed by a discus-
sion on what factors facilitate and what hinder the democratization of intelligence.
The analysis will draw on the experience of two developing democracies that have

































to democracy: Brazil and Romania. While a comparison between Romania and
Brazil may seem a stretch at first glance due to different geographic locations
and historical backgrounds, the two countries are worth comparing with regard
to intelligence, for at least the following reasons: they include two now classic
democratization areas (Latin America and Eastern Europe); they were both very
repressive dictatorships, in which the intelligence agencies were the chief props
of the authoritarian leaders; despite the dictatorial pasts, they are both widely con-
sidered to be consolidated democracies after 20 years or so; they are currently
important security actors both regionally and globally (e.g. contributors with secur-
ity and intelligence forces to various international security and peace operations
and missions); in their path toward intelligence democratization, they both have
had to overcome a tortuous “labyrinth” of more or less similar challenges and com-
plexities involving intelligence reform, but appear to be developing intelligence
agencies that are effective and under democratic control; in our interviews we
have discovered that reformists in the area of intelligence in both countries see
similarities between their experiences; and, the two governments have sought to
broadcast and popularize their progress in intelligence reform, which has resulted
in a relative openness which offers the authors a high level of access to reliable
information on this topic in both countries.4
Romania and Brazil have implemented major reforms of their intelligence
systems for more than 20 years seeking to transform the dictatorships’ nefarious
intelligence apparatuses into agencies that safeguard Romania’s and Brazil’s citi-
zens and democracy. Since the regime change in 1989, intelligence reform in
Romania followed two paths: one imposed by democratic consolidation,
which focused on increased transparency (by establishing new institutions and
bringing them under democratic control) and the other, imposed by the country’s
security environment, which focuses on increased effectiveness. By contrast,
intelligence reform in Brazil, at least for the first two decades since 1985,
was mainly imposed by priorities of democratic consolidation, and less by the
current security trends/effectiveness. However, with the 2007 PANAM
games, The World Cup in soccer in 2014, and the 2016 Olympic Games, all
held or to be held in Rio de Janeiro, effectiveness of intelligence, too, has
become a priority in the democratic reform of intelligence. In both countries,
balancing effectiveness with democratic civilian control has required an over-
haul of the intelligence structure and personnel, creating a legal framework
for intelligence and security, as well as the institutionalization of democratic
control mechanisms to guide and monitor the intelligence work. Despite chal-
lenges arising from discrepancies within the legislation, scattered politicization
and abuses, corruption and ineffectual democratic control, in the long run
(much more rapidly in Romania), the countries’ efforts to democratize their
new intelligence systems are gradually leading to professional intelligence
systems that fulfill their mandates effectively and within the framework of
sound domestic and international partnerships, while accountable to the
elected officials, and ultimately to the citizens.
































Relevant literature on intelligence democratization
There is a very large and rich literature on intelligence in established Western
democracies. Authors writing on intelligence failures include such luminaries as
Richard K. Betts, Robert Jervis, Gregory F. Treverton, James Wirtz, and Amy
Zegart.5 Other scholars examine the larger issues involved in intelligence in con-
solidated democracies. They include, to name just a few, Sherman Kent, Mark
M. Lowenthal, Michael Hermann, Loch K. Johnson, Peter Gill, Harry Howe
Ransom, Kate Martin, Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley
K. Wark. Together they make important contributions to our understanding of
the dynamics involving the relationship between intelligence, rule of law, ethics,
human rights, and other democratic values, but all focused on Western case
studies.6 Then too, there is a huge outpouring of studies and reports on the USA
from the Congressional Research Service and the intelligence community itself.7
In stark contrast, there is extremely little literature on intelligence reform in
newer democracies. For example, in three of the most widely used and recent
anthologies or handbooks of intelligence, in which there are a total of 124 chapters,
only five deal with intelligence in countries that have made transitions from dicta-
torships to democracies. And, the two authors here are responsible for two of the
five.8 In addition, we have reviewed a very comprehensive bibliography on intelli-
gence prepared and updated by Greta Marlatt of the Naval Postgraduate School
library for teaching and research purposes; of the approximately 470 books,
reports and documents listed only maximum of 17 deal with newer democracies.9
This is due to many reasons, but probably most important is the fact that in all but a
small number of newer democracies intelligence is not a respectable topic for
study; it has yet to be accepted as valid in the academic environment so very
few researchers have even attempted to study it.10
Democratic reform of intelligence
Whether a dictatorship or a democracy, all countries have at least one intelligence
organization of some scale, focus, and competence. The difference, however,
between an intelligence service operating in a democracy and that operating in
an authoritarian regime is that in the former, intelligence operates within a
balance between secrecy/effectiveness and accountability/transparency, while in
the latter, intelligence is enshrouded by virtually total secrecy, law breaking and
abuses, to ensure effectiveness (in terms of defending the regime, most often
against its own people). From this perspective, for newer democracies, transition-
ing from authoritarian to democratic regimes, finding a balance between intelli-
gence effectiveness and transparency is extremely difficult.
In dealing with the intelligence services in new democracies, what must be
done to achieve the democratization of these organizations? What reforms must
be undertaken in order to reach an acceptable balance between effectiveness and
transparency? The fundamental question is, of course, what is meant by democra-

































One of the few scholars studying intelligence in new democracies, Timothy
Edmunds, views successful democratization of the intelligence services as a
three-level reform process, including: establishing standards and procedures for
democratic civilian control and oversight of the intelligence agencies; consolidat-
ing the democratic nature of this control through explicit mechanisms; and, devel-
oping relevant expertise and capacities to support intelligence activities (to include
organizational reform, openness to new roles and missions, and removing the
“systemic impurities” from the authoritarian past).11 The first two levels deal
mostly with intelligence accountability and transparency, while the third level is
more concerned with effectiveness.
More explicitly, and following Edmunds’ lead, democratization of intelligence
involves, at a minimum, the following steps. First, after creating new agencies (or
reorganizing old ones), crafting the legal frameworks, which establish intelligence
roles, control, oversight, accountability and transparency. Enacting laws that
impose effectiveness and transparency is imperative to make sure the agencies
refrain from oppressive and illegal activities. Next is establishing and strengthen-
ing institutions and mechanisms for control and oversight of the intelligence
services, to ensure intelligence is, at some level, accountable to the citizens.
Control of the intelligence agencies may involve direction and oversight by the fol-
lowing bodies: executive (ministries of defense, directors of intelligence commu-
nities, national security councils, or equivalent organizations for interagency
coordination), which delineates priorities and directives, roles and missions, as
well as basic structures and organization; legislative (standing or ad hoc commit-
tees within the legislatures, and their staff), which enact laws on intelligence,
control and review of the intelligence agencies’ activities, budgets, and personnel;
judicial, which ensures the agencies use their special powers according to the law,
and protects citizens’ rights from the agencies’ intrusive collection and searches;
internal legal accountability mechanisms within intelligence organizations
(general counsels and inspectors general), which review and assess intelligence
activity; and, external mechanisms (at both domestic and international levels),
which involve scrutiny of the intelligence organizations by “outsiders” (free
press, independent think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
international organizations). Last, is recognition of the need to develop additional
principles and practices that boost the effectiveness of the intelligence agencies and
strengthen the democratic nature of control and oversight: raising public interest on
intelligence and security matters; increasing civilian expertise in intelligence; insti-
tutionalizing processes that support transparency and effectiveness; fostering a pol-
itical culture that supports intelligence in society and inside the agencies; and,
professionalizing the intelligence services. In summary, the answer to what is
meant by the democratization of intelligence is the following: establishing an insti-
tutional framework whereby democratically elected civilians can control the intel-
ligence agencies and at the same time maximize their potential for effectiveness.
The answer to acceptable to who is – to the population in the new democracy
that vote for politicians who have responsibility for establishing and controlling
































the institutions. We now turn to the factors we have identified as facilitating, or
impeding, the overall process involved in democratizing intelligence, and illustrate
them from our case studies in Brazil and Romania.12
Democratic reform of intelligence: factors that support or arrest progress
Unless a country itself fails to democratize and regresses to an authoritarian regime
(such as Russia), there are neither “total” successes nor “total” failures in intelli-
gence democratization. There are, rather, several common elements that either
facilitate or impede progress in intelligence democratization.
Factors that arrest progress
Factors that arrest progress in democratizing intelligence in a new democracy are
numerous, but the most important are the following: the complexity of reform
itself; legacies of the authoritarian regime impeding the democratic reform
process; resistance and reluctance to reform by the intelligence services; lack of
expertise by civilians; lack of support for intelligence and intelligence culture
among intelligence outsiders; corruption and organized crime; and, at least
hypothetically, the threat of overall democratic regress. All these have negative
impact on both effectiveness and transparency of the newly created, or reformed,
intelligence systems.
The complexity of the intelligence reform process: painstaking processes, lack of
institutions and resources, competing priorities. A first factor that hinders progress
is the complexity of the intelligence reform itself. As described earlier, the demo-
cratization of intelligence is a complex process, involving a comprehensive over-
hauling of a host of security and intelligence concepts, policies and procedures, to
seek to achieve an effectiveness–transparency balance. We find that these changes
must be integrated in a more comprehensive democratic transformation of the
entire security and defense sectors (e.g. reform of the military, police, border
control institutions, etc), and, ultimately, of an overall economic, political and
societal reform. It is extremely challenging for new governments, without experi-
ence in running a democratic state, to handle such multiple and complex insti-
tutional and policy changes. Larry Watts states, in a study on democratic reform
of intelligence in Central and Eastern Europe, “the recasting of entire states has
meant thinly spread resources, insufficient administrative capacity, high levels of
political uncertainty, and institutional confusion”.13 Transition regimes lack
mature institutions in all domains of security, including intelligence, impeding
their ability to achieve a balance between security and democracy. In most cases
new democracies must develop from scratch structures and processes that would
establish: legal and organizational provisions that set the roles and missions, direc-
tion, and prioritizing tasks for the agencies; tools of interagency coordination and

































developing a working relationship with the executive, legislatures, civil society
and international groups; and, effective mechanisms of democratic control and
oversight. Even with institutions in place, “authoritarianism and military politics
may continue behind the formalities of civilian and democratic governance”.14
The new institutions need to establish sufficient legitimacy, to be able to undertake
a rigorous democratic reform of the intelligence services and/or execute a robust
democratic control and oversight, which affect both the effectiveness and transpar-
ency of the newly developed intelligence agencies. This is even more difficult
when the legitimacy of the governments is in jeopardy, as they are repeatedly con-
tested and questioned. Governments generally focus on maintaining their authority
and not security and intelligence reform; what is more, sometimes, instead of
focusing on “democratizing intelligence”, governments use intelligence in a
non-democratic way (in line with “the bad old days”), to maintain control. And,
even if the legitimacy issue is resolved, more pressing issues such as economic
development, health care, and education, get higher priority on the
governments’ agendas, which receive more resources and time to the detriment
of security/intelligence.
It took both Brazil and Romania at least 15 years to institute a security and
intelligence reform, and there are still areas requiring improvement. Although,
Romania has gradually established a rich legal framework for its intelligence
system (which encompasses the intelligence mandate, coordination, control, over-
sight, accountability, and transparency), it has been flawed: now, 20 years after the
end of the communist dictatorship, with Romania both a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) member, part of the basic legis-
lation still goes back to the first years of transition, when there was no security
culture and knowledge, when Romania was not a global and regional security pro-
vider, and, when the security environment was different from the current one; and,
parts of the legislation are unclear or at odds with other parts of the legal frame-
work. All these have undermined the agencies’ transparency and effectiveness,
in that it helped perpetuate intelligence politicization, misbehavior, and wrong-
doing, and obstructed democratic control.15 In addition, despite the enactment of
laws and regulations on democratic control, establishment of parliamentary com-
mittees, and their relatively robust authority to exercise control and oversight, the
legislative control and oversight has, for many years, been challenged by deficient
parliamentary expertise, poor cooperation and coordination among parliamentary
committees as well as between former and current members of the oversight com-
mittees, and resistance of the intelligence agencies. Furthermore, since, occasion-
ally, Romania’s governments have been contested and/or impeached, garnering
legitimacy to enable decision-makers to undertake a robust reform and democratic
control was also problematic (sometimes especially because the authorities used
intelligence to maintain their authority, or win domestic political struggles).
Brazil has established a more robust and detailed legal framework for the intelli-
gence system (including components of the intelligence and national security
system, roles and missions, subordination, democratic control and transparency),
































when compared with Romania.16 Nevertheless, legislative control and oversight
has been minimal. Even if a Joint Commission for External Control of Intelligence
Activities (CCAI) had been established in the Brazilian Congress, until today it
lacks a statutory basis, therefore, with no legal basis and one member of staff,
legislative control and oversight had been ineffective (if not inexistent).
Legacies of the non-democratic past. One of the most insidious and pernicious
impediments to intelligence democratization is the detrimental impact the non-
democratic past has on the general perception of intelligence. In virtually all
newer democracies, the intelligence agencies bear a “stigma” of their non-
democratic past and misconduct. With a few notable exceptions,17 after a regime
change, the new agencies tend to preserve the personnel, premises and other
assets of the intelligence apparatuses of the non-democratic institutions. The
residual personnel may perpetuate abuses and violations of human rights for per-
sonal or political reasons. Intelligence agencies become politicized, as politicians
use them to deter and remove potential political adversaries, aggressive investiga-
tive journalists, and other possible opponents.
In both Brazil and Romania, the continuity of former non-democratic personnel
in the newly created agencies, had a pernicious impact on the democratic reform in
general, and of intelligence, in particular. Brazil, for example, created its post-
dictatorial intelligence agency – the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) –
out of the ruins of the non-democratic National Information Service (SNI), main-
taining a great number of former SNI personnel. They continued to be involved in
numerous scandals and abuses (especially concerning illegal wiretapping, with
incriminating tapes frequently leaking to the press), and often became politi-
cized.18 Examples include allegations and complaints from Brazil’s Muslim com-
munity about the ABIN illegal surveillance of Muslims, abuses against
organizations like Greenpeace and Americas Watch (which actually resulted in
the firing of the ABIN director by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso), or alle-
gations in 2008 that ABIN wiretapped the head of Brazil’s supreme court.19
Romania, too, created its post-communist intelligence system by dividing the
former communist political police (the notorious Securitate) in several agencies,
preserving Securitate personnel, facilities and assets. Literature is replete with
examples of violations of civil and individual rights and liberties for personal
and political, rather than security reasons, even after the country’s accession into
NATO and EU.20
Resistance and reluctance to reform by the intelligence services. Intelligence
agencies may oppose democratic reform for a variety of ideological, political
and bureaucratic reasons. Since, under the non-democratic regimes intelligence
agencies used to serve a restricted and highly privileged political class and
enjoyed special benefits, they are likely to be suspicious of any political change
than any other government organization. Democratic reform means intelligence

































and illegalities, and, undergo downsizing, vetting, and retrospective investigation
of their past practices and actions, which they, not surprisingly, try to resist. They
may even use their “special powers” and access to files/records to stall or influence
the reform by blackmailing or coercing decision-makers. In addition, intelligence
agencies challenge democratic reform (specifically, democratic control) as they
generally lack confidence in the political decision-makers’ expertise on intelli-
gence, doubt that national security is a high priority on the politicians’ agenda,
and consider that too much transparency or democratic scrutiny will undermine
their effectiveness. Last, intelligence agencies are bureaucracies, and bureaucracies
are hard to reform even in a democratic country; harder in a transition regime.
Not only intelligence agencies, but also elected officials avoid or initially
oppose reforming intelligence. To begin with, to avoid suspicion of having been
involved in past political police activities, politicians may circumvent any involve-
ment with the intelligence apparatus that carries the stigma of having been a tool of
repression under the old regime; or, they may avoid taking on radical reforms of
intelligence and thorough democratic control from fear that intelligence agencies
may have something embarrassing on them. As Peter Gill argues, “in many tran-
sition regimes there is such a deep well of mistrust of security agencies that
anyone dealing with them may find themselves under suspicion as a ‘spook’ of
informer”.21 Decision-makers may also wish to be able to deny knowledge of
illegal operations in order to avoid any possible suspicion that they tolerate
illegal activities and practices. Last, politicians may refuse to undertake significant
intelligence reforms for fear of resistance (fearing that intelligence personnel have
accumulated, and maybe are still collecting, information that could be used against
them). An additional issue is that many new democracies tend to suffer from a so-
called transition fatigue – a post-transition stagnation in political and social
changes – which curbs any interest and keenness for reform.
Both intelligence and decision-makers in Brazil and Romania tried to resist
intelligence reform. Once a monopoly of the military, the Brazilian intelligence ser-
vices opposed civilian authority, and continued to be highly autonomous and
powerful for years, after the regime change in 1985; in addition, the fact that, in
Brazil, political parties that include former guerrillas became part of the govern-
ment, made this issue even more problematic since the politicians harbored deep
antipathy to their former enemies.22 Intelligence reform for Brazilian politicians
was not a priority after the abrupt abolition of the SNI in 1990. Even though
Romania belongs to NATO, EU, OSCE, etc., which provide real incentives for
intelligence reform, for years Romanian intelligence agencies tried to resist demo-
cratic reform as they mistrust political decision-makers’ expertise on intelligence
and capability to handle classified information properly (to the detriment of their
effectiveness);23 they sometimes refused to respond to lawful requests for
reports, data and information by the legislatures, or sent incomplete information.24
In addition, strengthening domestic intelligence cooperation and sharing has
been challenging, due to agencies’ bureaucratic environment (which hinders infor-
mation sharing and collaboration), too many intelligence agencies (which fueled
































dishonest competition and rivalry among agencies, because of redundancy and
overlapping roles and missions), and politicization.25 Likewise, the politicians
occasionally manifested a “hands-off” attitude toward intelligence. A notorious
example is the procrastination of the enactment of a national Security Law
package for over 4 years. In addition, a transition fatigue also affected security
and intelligence reform in the region; a regional study on “transition fatigue” in
several countries from Central and Eastern Europe, including Romania, found
that, between 1991 and 2004, the overall support in the region for change at the
economic and political sectors was low.26
Lack of civilian expertise. By and large, democratic reform of intelligence agencies
is a terra incognita for the governments in new democracies. In democratizing
societies, elected and appointed officials have limited knowledge or experience
on what intelligence (let alone “democratic intelligence”) involves, since their pre-
vious exposure (if any) to security and/or intelligence matters had been in an
authoritarian environment, where fear and total secrecy prevailed. As a result,
lack of expertise in intelligence makes it impossible for decision-makers to have
an informed opinion on the topic, or choose the best reform avenues, policies
and practices. With no prior knowledge, legislators are less likely to establish a
vigorous legal framework for operating an intelligence system in a democracy,
provide appropriate direction and tasking, conduct reviews of budgets, expendi-
tures and activities, carry out inquiries and interpellations, and/or, provide
feedback to the intelligence agencies, upon receipt of intelligence briefs and
summaries. And, judicial bodies may be incapable of discerning when and if
they need to grant a surveillance warrant. All these challenges, coupled with
weak institutions, increase the potential for abuses (e.g. illegal wiretaps, surveil-
lance, and informants), on the one hand, or lead to mutual tensions between
decision-makers and intelligence agencies that delay or oppose the democratic
transformation, on the other hand.
Intelligence agencies of transition regimes also lack professionalism.27 A “pro-
fessional” intelligence service in a democracy involves a series of formal and struc-
tured personnel commitments, such as strict entrance requirements, ongoing
training and education programs, specific code of ethics (to include respect for
human rights and liberties), and mechanisms enabling cumulative learning and
improvement. Considering all these, the natural tendency of the new democracies
to rely on the intelligence “experts” from the former regime (now “true supporters”
of democracy) is deleterious to the professionalization of the new intelligence
agencies. The recycled personnel may continue to operate as in the past for their
own personal or political parties’ benefit (disregarding democratic principles of
rule of law and respect for citizens’ rights, freedoms and private life), limit employ-
ment possibilities for a new generation of intelligence personnel, and/or convey
their “best practices” to the new agents. And, since the legal framework and demo-
cratic control mechanisms are not robust enough to effectively question and repri-

































retirement or firing of the old intelligence personnel, as well as hiring new person-
nel, are also problematic. For example, retired or fired personnel may create or join
competing agencies in the private sector, often better supplied and equipped, or
support or join organized crime networks.
Democratization of intelligence in Romania and Brazil was hindered
(especially at the beginning of transition) by the lack of expertise and profession-
alism of decision-makers. In Romania, post-transition decision-makers were more
or less former Communist Party (PCR) members, trained in communist schools, in
country or in the former USSR. Mentalities remained unchanged, and did policies.
To begin with, first post-communist president Ion Iliescu (1990–1996 and 2000–
2004), a former PCR member, educated in Moscow, who had opposed Ceausescu
but not communism during the Cold War, ran his policies and decisions based on
communist beliefs and authoritarian-like management: he did not eliminate corrup-
tion, clientelism, and wrongdoing within the government and intelligence services,
refused to consider the merging of agencies (invoking a concern of a Securitate
return), and appointed two notorious Securitate officers as heads of the domestic
and foreign intelligence agencies, who favored politicization and misconduct,
and revived the communist era duplicity toward Western countries. Our preceding
discussions have already emphasized the challenges derived from the lack of
expertise and knowledge of Romanian control and oversight bodies. In Brazil,
after the abolition of the SNI in 1990, there was a lapse of 10 years before
ABIN was created by the Fernando Henrique administration in December of
1999. Obviously, without an active civilian intelligence agency there was no
basis whereby civilian politicians and bureaucrats could learn about intelligence,
its uses and how to control it.28
Precarious expertise and professionalism of the intelligence personnel also
challenged the democratization of intelligence. The newly created intelligence
agencies in Romania inherited the “expertise” of the Securitate agents. Given
the Securitate’s loyalty to the Ceausescus and the communist regime, and not
the country, as well as its notorious practices (from simple surveillance to sabotage,
and assassinations), one can only surmise that “human rights” or “ethics” were not
among the teaching subjects for intelligence personnel. As a result, former Secur-
itate personnel in the immediate post-communist agencies perpetuated illegal sur-
veillance and political police activities. Even if Romania undertook formal vetting
of the legacy personnel, the purging and vetting have been challenging: the down-
sized personnel have been employed by other institutions, with no vetting require-
ments (which allowed them to continue their practices in the new institutions),
opened their own private businesses, or became involved in serious corruption
and organized crime activities.29 On the other hand, since the Securitate stigma lin-
gered for years, intelligence was not an attractive career. It took some time in
Romania until SRI or Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) have received a great
number of job applications. Basically the same situation applied to Brazil, where
the training was military and tradecraft.30 In Brazil, former SNI personnel contin-
ued to fill high-responsibility positions in ABIN. A scandal occurred in 1999
































revealed ABIN’s involvement in illegal wiretapping for political reasons, conclud-
ing that many ABIN personnel who had worked previously for the SNI, conducted
illegal surveillance thus violating basic legal rights and liberties.31 Moreover,
young analysts in ABIN lament they have to put up with obsolete, authoritarian
and militarist mentalities, directions, and actions of former SNI personnel who
hold in key positions in the new ABIN.32
Lack of public support for intelligence and inexistent intelligence culture. As pre-
viously stated, for the general public, the legacy agencies continue to be the beˆtes
noires of the government for a long time after the transition to democracy. Due to
mistrust and even hatred, there is almost no support for the intelligence functions at
the beginning of transition. Citizens (including political elites) in new democracies
more or less oppose creating new intelligence systems, for fear of a return to a non-
democratic regime. And, if, for whatever purpose, new intelligence agencies are
established (as was the case in Brazil due to the foresight of President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso), the populace has reason to doubt their democratic transform-
ation. Lack of support for intelligence goes hand in hand with lack of intelligence
culture and knowledge among the intelligence outsiders. In transition regimes, the
population, civil society, as well as the elected and appointed officials, lack under-
standing why effective intelligence is needed, even in a democracy, do not know
what effective intelligence involves (e.g. the need for some level of secrecy),
and are unfamiliar with democratic control mechanisms (which would balance
security with transparency). In other words, security is not “part of an accepted
pattern of behavior outside of government and inside,”33 thus support for intelli-
gence is lukewarm at best.
Intelligence agencies in transition regimes lack (at least initially) both the
organization and the expertise to develop robust public relations and outreach, to
enable them to cleanse their image and gain popular support; due to the excessive
secrecy surrounding their past work (most of the time illegal and abusive) during
the non-democratic regime, it is less likely intelligence agencies had public affairs
offices or other means to open to the media or citizens. In addition, in many tran-
sition states, the media, which might theoretically have the means to promote intel-
ligence agencies’ images, fail to do so (they rather seek the opposite – discrediting
intelligence agencies), due to lack of professionalism (especially at the beginning
of transition). And, since public debate on intelligence issues is generally domi-
nated by the sensationalist media, and intelligence agencies tend to remain her-
metic even if formal oversight mechanisms exist and politicians have security
clearances, it is difficult for intelligence outsiders to attain an intelligence
culture/knowledge.
The newly created intelligence agencies in both Romania and Brazil started
with no support from the citizens as well as inexistent intelligence culture. In
Romania, during the first days of transition, the new political elites dismantled
the Securitate, and placed it under the control of the armed forces, without creating

































established (as a response to scattered inter-ethnic issues), since they preserved the
premises, personnel (especially in key positions) assets, and conduct, support from
population was basically inexistent. Moreover, Ceausescu’s dictatorship and rule
of the Securitate had bestowed a “culture of secrecy”, in which the “public’s
right to know” had no significance for the Romanian intelligence agencies, and
which also encouraged citizenry mistrust in the openness of the intelligence
agencies. A 2002 poll revealed that only 23% of the population considered that
the intelligence agencies offered sufficient information to the public (2 years
after a Freedom of Information Act law was enacted).34 An intelligence culture
was absent for many years since the regime change, due to the fact that a “civil
society” was inexistent during communism, and basically commenced from
scratch. Hence, the intelligence outsiders’ lack of understanding of the need for
intelligence in a democracy. The media, in particular, at least for the first years
after the transition, lacked professionalism, thus also being unwilling or unable
to help inculcate an intelligence culture in the outsiders. The fact that occasionally
the heads of intelligence agencies tried to deter the press from publishing inconve-
nient materials, was also an obstacle in both gaining popular support, and improv-
ing the outsiders’ intelligence culture.
In Brazil, lack of trust starts within the organization itself; once ABIN was
created in early 2000, it brought much of the SNI personnel on board (many,
also in key positions), not only focused public scrutiny on the agency, but also
triggered an acute lack of confidence within the agency itself (especially the new
personnel) in the old timers’ capability and willingness to change and act democra-
tically.35 The media is sensationalist, and, according to intelligence personnel, not
at all supportive of the organization’s raison d’etre. This, coupled with the
decision-makers’ reiterated hostility toward maintaining an effective intelligence
(due to Brazilians’ Pollyanna-like attitude that Brazil has no enemies), were detri-
mental to ABIN’s development;36 with no public support and lack of interest on
those who are supposed to work hand in hand with the agencies to safeguard the
security of the country, it was rather difficult and slow for an intelligence culture
to develop among intelligence outsiders. Furthermore, while employees in
ABIN complained about the media’s sensationalism and bias, it had done little
to improve its image. Finally, ABIN opened to the media and public, when it
first organized a seminar on intelligence and democracy in 2005.
Corruption and organized crime. Following the transition to democracy, the fragile
and contested legitimacy of the newly formed political elites and weakness of new
institutions, open borders and free movement policies, rising poverty and inequal-
ity, potential conflicts in the neighboring areas and increased insecurity, as well as
increased opportunities for enrichment through illegal avenues, led to mounting
corruption and organized crime activities. Criminal groups are wealthy enough
to corrupt the state institutions, or, worse, to directly penetrate into the state insti-
tutions (including intelligence agencies), therefore democratic reform, in general,
and of the intelligence, in particular are seriously challenged. Weeding out
































corruption and organized crime is very difficult, harder even than, for instance,
increasing intelligence professionalism or, strengthening parliamentary commit-
tees’ expertise in intelligence and security matters.
Corruption and organized crime harmed democratization of the intelligence in
Brazil and Romania. Numerous reports draw the attention to the direct involvement
of both Brazilian and Romanian government officials in corruption and criminal
activities.37 In both countries, corruption, favoritism, nepotism, bribery, and black-
mail (including blackmail with the files kept by the non-democratic regimes) –
hangovers of the dictatorships – have lingered for years after the regimes
changed, which affected the capability of the intelligence agencies to fulfill their
assigned responsibilities (as they had other “priorities”), and made democratic
control very difficult.
Overall democratic regress. If transition states are incapable of providing basic
human rights, freedoms and liberties for its citizens, fall short in attaining political
freedom and pluralism, lack free market economies, do not possess vigorous civil
societies, and are incapable of bringing their security services (including intelligence)
under civilian democratic control and oversight, they, by definition, fail to democra-
tize.As these countries remainmoderately or strongly authoritarian,more likely intel-
ligence agencies remain unreformed and non-democratic. Examples include states of
the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – including Russia, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus – which, according to Larry Diamond, have largely
regressed from democratic possibilities, or reinstated non-communist dictatorship.38
In these countries, not only have the governments failed in strengthening the demo-
cratic values and norms, but there is also little support for democracy throughout the
population. Intelligence agencies continue to be the chief prop of the regime, and
conduct their clandestine activities against population.
Overall democratic regress has not been the case of either Brazil or Romania.
Indeed, both Romania and Brazil are rated as free, with scores of 2 on both Political
Rights and Civil Liberties.39
Factors that support progress
There are several factors supporting progress in democratizing intelligence in an
emerging democracy. The most important are the following: willingness of the pol-
itical decision-makers to foster intelligence reform and achieve a balance between
effectiveness and transparency; the role and influence of the foreign assistance;
awareness of emerging security threats of the twenty-first century and thus the
need for increased cooperation and intelligence sharing; and the role of the civil
society and the media in advancing democratic reform of the intelligence. For
all these, time is crucial; if some democracies have found a workable balance
between effectiveness and transparency of their intelligence systems, it did not

































Time and willingness of decision-makers to democratize intelligence. We have
found in our research that if decision-makers are committed to investigate
the work and organization of the intelligence systems inherited from the
non-democratic regimes they can ultimately record significant progress in democra-
tizing the agencies, consolidating the democratic control and oversight, and
developing capabilities to support intelligence activities. With a certain amount of
political will they can improve democratic control capabilities, on the one hand,
and strengthen the effectiveness of intelligence work, on the other hand. In doing
so decision-makers embark upon more serious reforming and advanced democratic
control, aiming at raising public interest on intelligence and securitymatters, increas-
ing civilian awareness and competence in the field of security and intelligence, insti-
tutionalizing processes that support transparency and effectiveness, fostering a
political culture that supports and trusts intelligence in society and inside the IC,
as well as professionalizing the intelligence services.40 We have found that the
following three factors encourage this political will and facilitate the reforms.
Lack of experience, limited knowledge on intelligence, and secretive nature of
bureaucratic intelligence agencies, did not ultimately discourage decision-makers
in Brazil and Romania from embarking upon reforming the new intelligence
systems. Since the end of the authoritarian regimes, in 1985 and 1989, respect-
ively, both Brazil and Romania, have gradually established legal frameworks
for the new intelligence systems, covering the mandate, coordination, control,
oversight, and transparency; likewise, mechanisms of control and oversight
within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the governments have
been created.41 In the case of Brazil, it is worth emphasizing the central role of
the Brazilian presidents in abolishing SNI, creation of ABIN, and the enactment
of legislation for democratic control of intelligence.42 In the case of Romania, it
is worth mentioning the urgency for democratic control (despite lack of insti-
tutions) when SRI had to report to the Parliament for the first time in November
1990, due to the public fear of a Securitate return.43 In order to improve demo-
cratic control as well as strengthen intelligence professionalism and effectiveness,
decision-makers in both Brazil and Romania have undertaken broader reforms to
raise public interest in intelligence, institutionalize processes that support transpar-
ency and effectiveness, and further promote a political culture that supports and
trusts intelligence in society and inside the community. Public debates and meet-
ings on security and intelligence matters (e.g. on improving the legal framework,
strengthening democratic control, national, regional and global security threats,
security and intelligence cooperation, etc.) have taken place in Brazil and
Romania, on a regular basis.44 In Brazil, particularly, public debates have been
a direct result of political and institutional bargains made during the transition
to democracy that saw the prerogatives diminished and finally largely eliminated.
International terrorism and recent intelligence failures by the USA and UK have
also invigorated more open discussion on the “effectiveness–transparency”
matrix, in the two countries. In both countries, military and intelligence education
and training institutions are now open to civilians who might one day become
































involved in controlling intelligence, while in Romania, some intelligence agencies
have allowed citizens, who do not deal with intelligence or security, to study in
their education institutions, without any constraint to work for the intelligence
or in any control mechanism. Agencies’ conferences, the press, and the open
source materials are additional avenues for civilians to develop intelligence knowl-
edge. To boost transparency and effectiveness, responsible civilians in Brazil and
Romania (e.g. National Security Councils, which in Brazil is called the Secretariat
for Institutional Security and in Romania the National Supreme Defense Council)
took a keener role in reviewing and updating legislation and documents related to
national security and intelligence, monitoring intelligence budgets, and activities,
ensuring protection of intelligence data and ongoing missions, as well as fostering
interagency coordination/cooperation. Professionalization of the Brazilian and
Romanian intelligence agencies has involved standards for recruitment (in parallel
with old-personnel removal) and promotion of new personnel, continuous edu-
cation and training programs for intelligence personnel (including ethics, human
rights, transparency and accountability), security clearances to access to classified
information, as well as instilling a responsibility for democracy.45 Currently, intel-
ligence personnel in both Brazil and Romania are adequately educated and trained
to tackle contemporary and future intelligence requirements; they are technically,
linguistically and culturally educated and trained specialists, adroit in their func-
tional, regional or country areas of expertise, and competent analysts. With
regard to enhancing professionalism and effectiveness, it is worth mentioning
the most recent reform initiatives in Romania (“Strategic Vision 2007–2010”)
launched by the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Agency (SRI) director George
Cristian Maior, aimed to accomplish the following: ample de-bureaucratization
at the management level, information flow, decision-making and dissemination;
organizational transformation to allow for more flexibility and better horizontal
cooperation among SRI structures, strengthening the analysis capacity. Maior’s
endeavors to modernize and strengthen SRI’s effectiveness and professionalism
are even more praiseworthy considering the legislation on national security and
intelligence personnel is still obsolete. Admittedly, today, general awareness of
the current security threats (ergo recognition of the need of an increased intelli-
gence effectiveness) exists among intelligence agencies, governments, civil
societies, and citizens in Brazil and Romania. Likewise, there is increased aware-
ness of the need for accountability (ergo recognition of the need of strengthened
control and improved information sharing).
Foreign influence and assistance. The end of the Cold War and advent of the
twenty-first century have spawned democracy and security promotion by the
Western states to the transition states, to assist the new democracies achieve
better standards of development and governance, eliminate internal security chal-
lenges (e.g. ungoverned spaces), fight terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking
and other transnational security menaces. Programs initiated by the USA, other

































and alliances, have involved aid, education and training, in the economic, politic,
financial, social, defense and security areas. Even if, initially, theWestern countries
were more focused on economic and social assistance programs, they eventually
attached some importance to security and intelligence reform and assistance. On
the one hand, the continuity of old-timers in the new democracies’ intelligence
agencies, their recurring abuses and violations of democratic norms, as well as
misuse of intelligence by parties and politicians, worried the Western democracies
and international cooperation institutions. On the other hand, the post-Cold War
increased need for international security cooperation in fighting terrorism and orga-
nized crime networks, has urged Western democracies look for partners and allies
among the transition nations, and propelled them to help new democracies conso-
lidate their intelligence and defense reform initiatives. US democratic CMR assist-
ance programs (aimed at strengthening democratic control, effectiveness and
efficiency of the security (including military, police, and intelligence) initiations,
or the United Nations and Western Europe’s security sector reform initiative
(aimed at the same thing), illustrate the shift on foreign aid and support toward
security. Moreover, in Europe, the NATO and the EU have decided to accept
former Eastern European Communist Block countries in their organizations, pro-
vided the new democracies had fulfilled a range of criteria, including democratic
reform of intelligence. The two security organizations’ membership requirements
coupled with their assistance and partnership programs, as well as Eastern Euro-
pean countries’ eagerness and receptivity toward foreign involvement in their
security reform, have augmented the democratic consolidation of aspirant
countries’ intelligence (military and civilian).46 As a result, countries in Eastern
Europe have currently more effective and transparent intelligence and better
accountability mechanisms, when compared with Latin American or African
nations.
Visits, exchange of experts and advisors, education and training for intelligence
personnel and outsiders, have resulted in improved legislation, and increased
expertise of the intelligence agents, as well as the executive and legislature commit-
tees’ members. Direct involvement of security organizations in vetting and screen-
ing of personnel expected to handle classified information has resulted in purging
of former personnel and better standards of securing and protecting classified infor-
mation. Assistance provided by international groups, think tanks, and NGOs –
such as the DCAF, United Nations Development Program, United Kingdom
Department for International Development, the Global Facilitation Network for
Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), the Security and Defense Network in Latin
America (RESDAL), Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO),
Chile, and others – have particularly strengthened the capacity of new democra-
cies’ executive and legislative control bodies, as well as civil societies to better
exercise their intelligence watchdog functions. The flurry of literature and
studies of democratic reform of the intelligence made available by DCAF or
GFN-SSR, as well as their dialogue with decision-makers and civil societies in
































several new democracies, has helped civilians learn about intelligence, thus contri-
buting to enriching their intelligence culture.
Both countries enjoyed foreign support and assistance with regard to security
and intelligence reform, but Romania far more than Brazil. Romania’s ardent desire
to contrast itself from its Slavic neighbors, and become on a par to the rest of the
Romance nation family, urged the country to pursue integration into both NATO
and EU, where “Roman” Italy, France, Spain and Portugal had long been
members. Romania embraced the two organizations’ assistance and partnership
programs (e.g. NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Individual Partnership Program
etc.) as well as membership requirements (e.g. NATO’s Membership Action
Plan, EU Acquis Communautaire), which urged the country to undertake major
reforms (including intelligence) and greatly contributed to the democratization
of the Romanian intelligence. Results of the Atlantic Alliance and EU’s contri-
bution to intelligence transformation in post-communist Romania included:
purging of Securitate personnel who were involved in abuses during the Ceausescu
regime, from the new intelligence agencies; screening of intelligence personnel
assigned to work with classified information (including NATO information); enact-
ing/amending legislation on and securing standards of protection of classified data
and information; strengthening professionalism, expertise and effectiveness of
intelligence personnel; fostering interagency cooperation and coordination; and,
boosting transparency, democratic control and oversight. In addition, assistance
programs of and special partnerships with individual Western countries, as well
as involvement of international non-profit organizations or think tanks in the intel-
ligence reform, have also advanced Romanian intelligence’ democratic consolida-
tion. Within the framework of the partnership and as part as the US security
cooperation initiative, Romania’s intelligence has received education and training
in intelligence, security, defense, counter terrorism and other security-related
issues. On the other hand, as NATO and/or EU do not have much say in Latin
America, foreign influence and assistance consists mostly of US programs. Never-
theless, ABIN has a long relationship with the US Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug
Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service and others.47 US CIA has contributed
to increasing ABIN personnel’s professionalism and effectiveness, through
exchange visits, education and training programs, and direct advice.48 The USA
has also worked bilaterally with Brazil to improve its counterterrorism capabilities
by providing counterterrorism training, and implementing the Container Security
Initiative at the port of Santos.49 In addition, Center for Civil-Military Relations
(CCMR) assisted the Brazilian Congress in developing intelligence control and
oversight committees, while the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA)
of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Department of Defense Analysis,
in Monterey, California, has been educating Romanian officers and civilians, in
their five quarter-long master degree program resident courses (covering intelli-
gence and democracy, and, respectively, intelligence and countering terrorism

































Team Seminars in both Romania and Brazil, on intelligence and democracy,
intelligence and combating terrorism, and interagency cooperation, for intelligence
professionals, parliamentarians, and the civil society.
Pressure by active civil society and media. In some new democracies, when formal
oversight mechanisms have failed to exercise their power, civil society and,
especially, the media, have stepped in and exposed intelligence (and government)
scandals, wrongdoing, abuses, and politicization, to both domestic and inter-
national audiences. By revealing intelligence scandals and misconduct to the dom-
estic and international public, not only have NGOs, think tanks, and the media
kindled regular debates on the intelligence and security matters, but also forced
the hand of the decision-makers to undertake intelligence reform and exercise
control and oversight more thoroughly. Despite the media’s natural proclivity to
sensationalism and economic gain, when “making” democratic change happen
in the intelligence realm (e.g. stirring up vetting and weeding out former non-
democratic personnel, bringing about enactment or amendment of intelligence
legislation, to equate transparency with effectiveness, and furthering accountability
and transparency), the media has proved a more effective oversight tool than the
overall formal control and oversight machinery.
In Romania, and, to a much lesser extent in Brazil, the civil society and the
media have played a role in encouraging intelligence reform and boosting demo-
cratic control. In Romania, despite the government’s sporadic attempts to
impede the media coverage or reporting, and its penchant for sensationalism, the
Romanian press has continuously watched the government and intelligence
agencies, pointing out every mistake, delay, or failure in the democratic reform,
to both the Romanian citizens and international audiences. The media in
Romania has helped ensure the intelligence apparatus does not regress into the
former Communist oppressive service, on the one hand, and that the NATO and
EU requirements are fulfilled, on the other hand. The media’s informal oversight
accomplishments include: contribution to the reduction of the number of intelli-
gence agencies (from at least nine to six); speeding up the vetting, screening and
firing of the former Securitate officers and promoting the recruitment of young per-
sonnel; supporting the process of granting Romanians access to Securitate files;
and exposing current public authorities who either collaborated with or were
employed by the former Securitate during the communist regime.50 Spirited civil
society organizations (e.g. the Center for Institutional Analysis and Development,
the “Grupul pentru Dialog Social” (“Group for Social Dialogue”) organization,
“Revista 22”, “European Institute for Risk, Security and Cooperation Manage-
ment” foundation, the “ALIANTA” association, the “Casa NATO” organization,
the “Manfred Worner” association, “Pro-Democracy” Association, “Media Moni-
toring Agency”, the “Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania”
(APADOR-CH), the “Center of Juridical Resources, the Center for Independent
Journalism”, the “Center of Assistance for Non-Governmental Organizations”,
the Foundation for the Development of the Civil Society, and others) have
































brought to public debate issues regarding national security (including the impor-
tance of amending the dated and quaint national security laws), the democratization
of the security institutions, as well as other aspects and challenges to intelligence
and national security. Hopefully, the media will continue to exercise its watchdog
power, now that Romania is in both NATO and EU and therefore lacks outside
catalysts for balancing transparency with effectiveness of the intelligence, and
admittedly, the formal democratic control and oversight mechanisms attach less
importance to intelligence reform and supervision. In Brazil, since the 1990s,
the media has been exposing reform challenges and failures, as well as abuses
and wrongdoing, in the social, economic, political, and security (including intelli-
gence) realms. Newspapers and journals are in general very critical to the Brazilian
government and intelligence agencies, and regularly contain ample coverage of
human abuses and violations. For example, in the early 1990s, the Brazilian
press was the first to investigate allegations of corruption and abuse of power
against then President Fernando Collor (dubbed by some as the "Brazilian Water-
gate"), which eventually led to the impeachment of Collor by Congress in 1992.51
Or, in the late 2008, the Brazilian media covered a wiretapping scandal involving
ABIN (alleged to have wiretapped the head of the country’s supreme court), which
led to the suspension of the ABIN directors, and stimulated the government to
further overhaul Brazilian intelligence agencies (e.g. clearer roles and missions,
personnel vetting, etc.).52 Despite concerns on the objectiveness of the press, the
media’s open criticism on the Brazilian intelligence community (inexistent under
the SNI), coupled with its influence on the government and intelligence reform
and oversight, have contributed to an increased transparency of the intelligence
agencies in Brazil.
Increased perception of the emerging threats of terrorism and organized crime. (1)
Awareness of and need for effectiveness: Post-Cold War security is threatened by
international terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, organized crime, and
other challenges, operated mainly by non-state actors, and led by less predictable
and less rational individuals or groups than during the Cold War. For emerging
democracies, even if the main focus of the intelligence democratization has long
been transparency and accountability, after the terrorist attacks in the USA
(2001), Spain (2004), and UK (2005), India (2008), and ongoing attempts on the
USA and other countries, avoiding major intelligence surprises, as well as better
responses to international terrorism and organized crime, have called for increased
effectiveness of the intelligence agencies. As a consequence, newer democracies
are pressured to amend legislation, change or create new structures, doctrines,
improve personnel education and training, and deepen interagency cooperation
and coordination, to join the international efforts to counter terrorism and orga-
nized crime.
(2) Awareness of and need for enhanced national and international cooperation: It is
virtually impossible for a government, let alone a single security institution tofight the

































sharing at the national level, and without cooperation with other nations. The 2001
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, and the failed terrorist plots in
late2009 and early 2010, appear to confirm this assumption: on the onehand, notwith-
standing theUSunrivaled intelligence capabilities, itwas the lack of coordination and
cooperation among security agencies, as well as shallow international cooperation,
that caused the intelligence “failure” of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks;53
on the other hand, the successful prevention of the “liquid bomb” terrorist threat in
the UK in 2006, was due to the cooperation of British intelligence and law enforce-
ment organizations. Unsurprisingly, the terrorist attacks in the USA (2001), Spain
(2004), and UK (2005), etc., have compelled countries to adjust their intelligence
systems – to become more network-like and more open toward sharing (including
sharing with foreign counterparts) – in order to prevent future failures. Although tre-
mendously challenging (e.g. information sharing between national intelligence
agencies tends to remain restricted and the information/intelligence flow is seldom
equal at the international level), intelligence sharing and cooperation have been a
goal for the twenty-first century governments. For a long time the general viewofBra-
zilian politicians was that Brazil had no enemies, and faced no challenges to national
security, even if the Tri-Border Area (a region bordering Brazil, Paraguay andArgen-
tina) is alleged to harbor not only criminal but also elements raising finances for ter-
rorist groups (e.g. Hezbollah and Hamas). Even if decision-makers have emphasized
all along the threats arising from globalization concerning science, technology and
natural resources, especially in the Amazon, all Brazilian officials had stated, until
very recently, that there was no terrorist threat to Brazil.54 Even more recently,
during an ABIN-sponsored international seminar on intelligence, held in Brasilia
in 2005 (to which both authors were invited to provide lectures on democratization
of intelligence), there was no focus on the escalating threat of international terrorism.
However, the following international intelligence Seminar, held in December 2006,
was entitled “Second International Seminar on State Intelligence, theMedia and Ter-
rorism” and focused on terrorism due to a series of concerns: Brazilians have become
more aware that international terroristsmay attack a foreign target (e.g. an embassy) in
a host country, as was the case in Kenya, Tanzania, and Argentina; the 2004 terrorist
attacks in Spain, which linked Al Qaeda to criminal groups, have increased concern
that Brazil, too, could be a target; third, was the 2007 pan American games hosted by
Brazil, and later by awarding the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. The
Brazilian government nowclearly acknowledges there are several security challenges
(including high homicide rates, organized crime, and possibly terrorism) in Brazil,
and have emphasized the need for intelligence effectiveness. As previously stated,
Brazilian government officials have eventually become aware of the need for effec-
tive collaborative fight against transnational organized crime, drug trafficking,
money laundering, and even terrorism. At the national level, interagency cooperation
and coordination is the taskof the top level of the executive branchof government, the
Secretariat for Institutional Security (GSI), functioning directly under the president.
GSI coordinates the flow of information and intelligence from various federal
agencies, and acts as a crisis management center for internal and external security.55
































A positive result of ABIN’s subordination to the GSI is that the agency has now less
authority over the other intelligence agencies, including military and police intelli-
gence. Internationally, Brazil has focused on strengthening cooperation and intelli-
gence sharing on countering terrorism and organized crime, especially focused on
the “Tri-Border Area”. Even if the Tri-Border region has been characterized by
limited formal counter terrorism legislation, corruption and organized-crime permiss-
ive government, and limited border-security capabilities, cooperation has progressed
in the region. An example includes the establishment in 2007 of a Joint Intelligence
Center to combat trans-border criminal organizations in theTri-BorderArea, following
the USA’ accession into the “3 + 1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security” in 2002.56
In Romania, on the other hand, there has always been awareness of the threat of
terrorism and organized crime. Debates by Romanian government representatives
on the elaboration of a National Security Strategy and a White Book on National
Defense, prior to 9/11, have focused on Romania’s position at the convergence of
many international money laundering, arm trafficking and organized crime routes,
and emphasized the gravity of the terrorism and organized crime for Romania and
the entire region. Moreover, the current security challenges have urged Romania
accelerate the pace of the intelligence reform, to focus intelligence effectiveness.
Immediately after 9/11, to adjust to the international efforts for countering terror-
ism, rapid changes occurred in the following: the legislation (e.g. on preventing
and combating terrorism, terrorist financing, organized crime and human traffick-
ing); structures (e.g. SRI became the national anti-terrorism authority, hosting a
Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism in 2001, in which functions
the Center of Counter-Terrorist Operational Coordination, while a special forces
anti-terrorism battalion for out-of-area operations under NATO or Multinational
Forces command, was set up in 2001); doctrines and policies; and, personnel, edu-
cation and training. In Romania, the “unknown unknowns” in the global “security
equation” have knitted security and intelligence agencies together more closely,
even if, by law, their roles and missions may differ. Besides bilateral agreements
and cooperation between various intelligence and security organizations, overall,
the National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT) coordinates the activity of all
security institutions, informs and advises the president on security issues, produces
security-related documents, and integrates all information provided by the intelli-
gence agencies and other national security institutions. Within the CSAT functions
a National Intelligence Community, which is the coordination body of all current
intelligence agencies, as well as an integrated structure that provides a centralized
processing of intelligence gathered by all its components (fair competition among
services), and disseminates it to relevant consumers – and ensured integrated intel-
ligence briefs/products dissemination.57 Internationally, Romania has strong
cooperation ties, as a result of NATO and EU membership and membership
requirements, as well as of Romania’s contribution (including intelligence) to
different peace operations and anti-terrorism missions, alongside foreign partners.
Besides being a NATO and EU member, Romania is part of the South East Europe

































Information Security Agency, the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the Inter-
national Bomb Data Center, the Balkan Communication Network, and others.
Conclusion
This article explores a central (and maybe the most challenging) component of
democratic consolidation: the democratization of intelligence (combining demo-
cratic control with effectiveness). It attempts to identify the factors either support-
ing or impeding progress of the democratization of intelligence, and illustrates
them in Romania and Brazil, two countries that transitioned to democracy from
authoritarian regimes, and have strived to reform their intelligence services.
Achieving a balance between effectiveness and democratic control is an ongoing
challenge in any democracy. If older democracies can fail one way or another to
balance democratic control with effectiveness, (as with successful terrorist attacks in
the USA, Great Britain, and Spain) how can new democracies be expected to be suc-
cessful? From our research and work with the intelligence agencies in developing
democracies, we have learned that, with few exceptions, there are neither “total” suc-
cesses nor “total” failures in democratic reform of intelligence agencies. There are,
rather, several factors impeding progress of intelligence reform (which include,
besides bureaucratic hurdles to intelligence reform, which are common in every
democracy, the complexity of reform itself, legacies of the former authoritarian
regimes, resistance and reluctance to reform, lack of expertise, non-existent support
for intelligence and lacking intelligence culture, and corruption and organized
crime), as thereare important factors supportingprogressof democratic reformof intel-
ligence (reform-oriented decision-makers, prospective foreign security assistance and
incentives, unavoidable or undeniable security threats of the twenty-first century, and
dynamic civil societies). Nevertheless, democratization of intelligence is not an
impossible job for new democracies. Time is very important also; even in long-estab-
lished democracies, having intelligence agencies that are both effective and accounta-
ble does not occur overnight. The same applies to emerging democracies, but more so.
Using the case studies of Romania and Brazil, we argue that neither was able to
overcome the past easily, and for many years democratizing their intelligence has
been plagued with many of the aforesaid causes of lack of reform. More recently,
factors that support progress are becoming obvious in their impact. In Brazil it has
been the awareness of projection on the world stage, with, for example, sending
peacekeepers to Haiti, and the upcoming highest possible profile world sports
events of the World Cup and the Olympics. Nevertheless, although for both
Romania and Brazil democratizing their new intelligence systems has been an
enormously challenging process, and despite setbacks, after decades of effort,
the two countries (more Romania than Brazil, mostly due to NATO/EU member-
ship desire and requirements), managed to institutionalize effective and transparent
new agencies, with robust legal bases, improved personnel standards, better infor-
mation sharing, more capable democratic control and oversight mechanisms, and
increasing public understanding and support for intelligence.
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